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PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
So important is the right of an accused to a speedy trial that
it is expressly guaranteed to him by Article I, Section 9, of the
Louisiana Constitution. Article 8 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure further protects that right by *providing maximum periods
within which prosecutions must be brought.' Our courts have
stressed the statement in Article 8 that "No person shall be prose-
cuted, tried or punished for any offense" on which the specified
prescriptive period has run. Thus, an accused may insist that
the judge decide the question in limine2 or he may have it re-
ferred to the jury. Once the issue goes to the jury, however, it
is too late for the defendant to demand that the judge pass on
it; he is deemed to have waived the right of having it decided
1. Art. 8, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928: "No person shall be prosecuted,
tried or punished for any offense, murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kid-
napping, aggravated arson, burglary in the nighttime, burglary in the day-
time, armed robbery, and treason excepted, unless the indictment, informa-
tion or affidavit for the same be found or filed within one year after the of-
fense shall have been made known to the judge, district attorney or grand
jury having jurisdiction; but this prescription shall not apply to prosecution
and conviction for a lesser offense under an indictment or information for
murder, aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated arson, burglary
in the nighttime, burglary in the daytime, armed robbery, or treason. Nor
shall any person be prosecuted for any fine or forfeiture unless the prosecu-
tion for the same shall be instituted within six months of the time of in-
curring such fine or forfeiture.
"Provided, that in all criminal prosecutions an indictment found, or an
information filed, or an affidavit filed where prosecution may be by affidavit,
before the above prescription has accrued, shall have the effect of interrupt-
ing such prescription; and if any such indictment, information or affidavit
be quashed, annulled or set aside, or a nolle prosequi be entered, prescrip-
tion of one year and six months, respectively, as above provided, shall begin
to run against another indictment, information or affidavit based on the
same facts, only from the time that said original indictment, information or
affidavit was quashed, set aside, annulled or nolle prosequied.
"In felony cases when three years elapse from the date of finding an
indictment, or filing an information, and in all other cases when two years
elapse from the date of finding an indictment, or filing an information or
affidavit, it shall be the duty of the district attorney to enter a nolle prosequi
if the accused has not been tried, and if the district attorney fail or neglect
to do so, the court may on motion of the defendant or his attorney cause
such nolle prosequi to be entered the same as if entered by the district at-
torney.
"Nothing in this article shall apply or extend to an accused- person who
has absconded, or who is a fugitive from Justice or who has escaped trial
through dilatory pleas, or continuances obtained by him or in his behalf.
[As amended, Acts 1935 (2nd E. S.), No. 21, §1; 1942; No. 147, §1.]"
2. State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917 111 So. 327 (1927); State v. Gendusa, 193
La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939).
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by the court.8 The plea of prescription may also be raised by a
motion for a new trial4 or by a motion in arrest of judgment.5
The first paragraph of Article 8.sets out two classes of pre-
scription which arise before indictment: (1) the prescription of
one year, which deals with offenses punishable by imprisonment;
and (2) that of six months, which deals with offenses punishable
only by fine or forfeiture. The great majority of the cases have
dealt with the one year prescriptive period. The cases are legion
to the effect that an indictment, which shows on its face that more
than a year has passed since the commission of the offense, is
fatally defective unless it also contains an allegation negativing
prescription.6 Article 8 provides specific authority for negativing
prescription by an allegation in the indictment that (1) the of-
fense had not been made known to a competent officer until with-
in a year of the indictment, (2) a previous indictment had been
found within the prescriptive period and a year had not elapsed
since the date on which it was set aside, or (3) the accused had
been a fugitive from justice until within a year of the indict-
ment. The court, in State v. Theard, provided a possible addi-
tional way of negativing prescription, i.e., by an allegation in the
indictment that defendant had not been amenable to prosecu-
tion because of his having been adjudged insane.
Perhaps the most troublesome problem arising in cases where
the state must negative prescription has been that of burden of
proof. Where the allegatiorA is that the offense was not made
known to the proper authorities until within a year of the indict-
ment, the court early took the view that, the burden should be
on the defendant to prove that there was, in fact, such knowledge
more than a year previous to the indictment.' The theory un-
derlying this was that the defendant could more easily prove the
affirmative fact of knowledge than could the state prove the "uni-
versal negative" that none of the competent officials had such
3. State v. Posey, 157 La. 550, 101 So. 869 (1924); State v. Brown, 185 La.
1023, 171 So. 433 (1936).
4. State v. Hinton, 49 La. Ann. 1354, 22 So. 617 (1897); State v. Foley, 113
La. 206, 36 So. 940 (1904).
5. State v. Bischoff, 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1919); State v. Block, 179 La.
426, 154 So. 46 (1934); State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
6. State v. Foster, 7 La. Ann. 256 (1852); State v. Freeman, 17 La. Ann.
69 (1865); State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939); State v. Gehlbach,
205 La. 340, 17 So.(2d) 349 (1943).
7. 203 La. 1026, 14 So.(2d) 824 (1943). This case dealt with the three year
class of prescription. The reasoning however seems equally applicable to
the one year class.
8. State v. Barrow, 31 La. Ann. 691 (1879; State v. Barfleld, 36 La. Ann.
89 (1884); State v. Robinson, 37 La. Ann. 676 (1885).
1945]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
knowledge until within a year of the indictment. In other words
the burden should "rest on the party who can most conveniently
and most certainly make the proof." Later, in State v. Bischoff,0
the court specifically repudiated the earlier line of cases, reason-
ing that a party making an allegation must prove it and is not to
be relieved of that responsibility merely because the allegation
happens to be in a negative form, when the information support-
ing it is entirely within his knowledge and control. In the lead-
ing case of State v. Posey," the court again reversed itself, spe-
cifically overruling the Bischoff case and reinstating the earlier
line of cases holding the burden to be on defendant to prove
knowledge. This decision has been followed consistently, and
apparently the matter is now well settled. It is not necessary,
however, that defendant prove actual knowledge on the part of
some competent officer; it is sufficient that he prove them to have
possessed information which should have put them on inquiry.12
Then, they are chargeable with knowledge of the facts which
such an inquiry would have revealed had it been made. On the
other hand, where the. officials knew of the offense but had ample
reason to believe that someone other than defendant had com-
mitted it and, in fact, prosecuted that other party, this knowledge
would not start prescription running -as to the accused.'3 Like-
wise, when the information possessed by the officials indicates
that the crime was committed in some other jurisdiction, pre-
scription will not begin to run until they obtain information
which should put them on notice that the offense might have
been committed within their jurisdiction.14 The language of the
allegation negativing prescription should be carefully chosen. It
was recently held in State v. Gehlbach,5 a four to three decision,
that an indictment alleging that "more than one year has not
elapsed" since the commission of the offense was made known to
the proper authorities, sufficiently tracked the article. It was
forcibly argued in a carefully written, but perhaps overly techni-
9. State v. Barrow, 31 La. Ann. 691, 694 (1879).
10. 146 La. 748, 84 So. 41 (1919), followed by State v. Richard, 149 La. 574,
89 So. 697 (1921).
11. 157 La. 550, 101 So. 869 (1924).
12. State v. Hayes, 161 La. 963, 109 So. 778 (1927); State v. Perkins, 181
La. 997, 160 So. 789 (1935); State v. Oliver, 193 La. 1084, 192 So. 725 (1939).
13. State v. Hanks, 38 La. Ann. 468 (1886); State v. Touchet, 46 La. Ann.
827, 15 So. 390 (1894); State v. Wren, 48 La. Ann. 803, 19 So. 745 (1896).
14. State v. Young, 194 La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940).
15. 205 La. 340, 17 So.(2d) 349 (1943). The Gehlbach case also held that
it was not necessary for the indictment to negative knowledge on the part
of the attorney general, citing and affirming State v. Bussa, 176 La. 87, 145
So. 276 (1933).
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cal, dissenting opinion that the allegation should have been more
precise, to the effect that "not one year had elapsed" from the
time of knowledge.
Where the indictment alleges an interruption of prescription.
by a previous indictment, the burden of proof is on the state."0
The jurisprudence on this point is clear and without conflict,
with a possible cloud case by the opinion in State v. Brown,'7
which will be dealt with at greater length in another connection.
Before the previous indictment will have the effect of interrupt-
ing prescription, however, it must have been found in the proper
jurisdiction."'
Where, to negative prescription, the indictment alleges that
the accused has been a fugitive from justice, the burden of proof
again is on the state.19 Here, the "universal negative" theory
favors the defendant. It would be more difficult for defendant
to prove that he was at no time during the prescriptive period a
fugitive from justice than it would be for the state to prove the
affirmative fact that he had been sought but not found. This rule
is apparently well settled, despite a suggestion to the contrary
by the opinion in State v. Brown,'20 wherein the court applied the
last clause2' of Article 9 to the one year class of prescription.
Because of the importance of this question, a brief analysis
of State v. Brown seems in order. The crime having been com-
16. State v. Hoffman, 120 La. 949, 45 So. 951 (1908); State v. Gendusa,
193 La. 59, 190 So. 332 (1939).
17. 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936).
18. State v. Smith, 200 La. 10, 7 So. (2d) 368 (1942). In the Smith case
the prosecution relied on State v. Young, 194 La. 1061, 195 So. 539 (1940).
That case, however, did not deal with the question of interruption by a
previous indictment but with whether a competent official had sufficient
knowledge of an offense to start prescription running. The only information
that the official had was such as to indicate that the offense had been com-
mitted in an adjoining jurisdiction. Having found this to be true, the su-
preme court held that such knowledge was not sufficient to start prescrip-
tion running. In the Smith case, on the other hand, the prosecuting authori-
ties knew all of the facts of the case but, making an error of law, decided
that Orleans Parish was the proper jurisdiction. The supreme court held
that their knowledge was sufficient to start prescription running and that
the indictment in Orleans Parish (set aside for lack of jurisdictioni) did not
have the effect of interrupting it. (The opinion in the Smith case was
grounded on the earlier case of State v. Cooley, 176 La. 448, 146 So. 19 (1933),
wherein it was held that, once the proper officials acquire the information,
prescription begins to run regardless of their private reasons for non-
action.)
19. State v. Anderson, 51 La. Ann.' 1181, 25 So. 990 (1889); State v. Gibson,
108 La. 464, 32 So. 332 (1902); State v. Berryhill, 188 La. 549, 177 So. 663 (1937).
20. 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433 (1936).
21. "Provided, further, that the burden of proving the accruing of the
prescription herein established shall in all cases rest upon the person alleg-
Ilig the same."
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mitted some four years previous to the indictment, the indict-
ment alleged that defendant had been a fugitive from justice.
The question before the supreme court was not one of burden of
proof,>but was whether the trial judge had erred in refusing to
permit defense counsel to withdraw the question of prescription
from the jury, after the state had rested its case, in order that he,
the trial judge, might pass on it. The supreme court approved
the refusal of the trial judge, saying, "While we think the ruling
of the trial judge on this particular point was correct, yet we
find it necessary to set aside the conviction and sentence on an-
other ground [on a question of admissibility of evidence]." Then,
perhaps as suggestion to counsel, it added that defendant could
still urge his plea of prescription upon assuming the burden of
proving the accrual of it, citing Article 9 as authority.
Both the language and the spirit of Article 9 seem clearly
to apply only to the prescriptive period which runs after indict-
ment. Its function seems to be to provide a procedure for setting
aside an indictment which has become prescribed according to
the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Article 8, and it seems to have
no application to prescription arising before indictment. It is
submitted that the application of Article 9 to the one year class
of prescription in State v. Brown was by way of dictum and, as
will be shown hereafter, has since been tacitly overruled or,
rather, ignored. In the later case of State v. Gendusa22 dealing
with interruption by a previous indictment, the court said,
"It was incumbent on the part of the State to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the crime charged in the indictment
was not prescribed. . . ." (Italics supplied.)
In State v. Berryhil23 the court approved the trial judges' charge
to the jury that "The State carries the burden of proving that the
accused 'fled from justice,' as defined to you." (Italics supplied.)
Had the supreme court seen fit to follow the suggestion made in
the Brown case, the above language would not only have been
22. 193 La. 59, 72, 190 So. 332, 336 (1939).
23. 188 La. 549, 555, 177 So. 663, 665 (1937). In this case the court said that
the state had to prove defendant's flight only by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. No mention was made of the Gendusa case and the degree of proof
required by it. True, the two cases deal with interruption by different alle-
gations, yet the principle seems to be' the same, and there seems to be no
reason for requiring a higher degree of proof in one than in the other. Be-
cause the facts do not relate to the guilt or innocence of the accused, It is
submitted that the later expression of the court is the better view. The na-
ture of the proof, however, probably makes the question one of academic
rather than practical importance.
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unnecessary but would have been erroneous since, if Article 9
is applicable to the one year class of prescription, by its express
language the burden would have rested on the defendant. Hence,
it seems safe to conclude that, as to this particular point, the su-
preme court has not seen fit to follow the dictum of the Brown
case and that the state bears the burden of proving its allegation
that the defendant had been a fugitive from justice.
In order to toll the running of the one year prescriptive
period the state must prove more than the naked fact that de-
fendant had been a fugitive; it must prove that he was a fugitive
from the authorities of this state. The fact that he had been a
fugitive from some other state, although he lived openly in Lou-
isiana all the while, will not interrupt prescription.' The state
must likewise prove that the accused had been a fugitive from
representatives of the law; mere flight from the wrath of private
citizens will not interrupt prescription.
2 5
The prescription of six months is applicable only where the
penalty for the offense is fine or forfeiture.2 6 If imprisonment
may be inflicted, the one year prescriptive period applies. 27 How-
ever, where the offense is punishable by fine only and the de-
fendant is sentenced to pay the fine on pain of imprisonment if
he fails, this does not take the case out of the six months pre-
scriptive class. 28 The imprisonment here is merely the conse-
quence of failing to obey a court order and not a direct conse-
quence of the offense. This class of prescription runs from the
commission of the offense to the date of the indictment, and it
cannot be negatived by lack of knowledge on the part of the au-
thorities.29 Dictum in the Edwards case80 indicates, however, that
it might be negatived by an allegation that the accused had been
a fugitive from justice-a view which is manifestly sound con-
sidering the all-inclusive language of the fourth paragraph of
Article 8. Similarly, the filing of a previous indictment would
probably interrupt the six months prescription.
Paragraph 3 of Article 8 provides for that type of prescrip-
tion which runs from the time an indictment is found. A defend-
ant must be tried within three years after indictment in felony
24. See State v. Berryhill, 188 La. 549, 177 So. 663 (1937).
25. State v. Hayes, 162 La. 917, 111 So. 327 (1927).
26. State v. Jumel, 13 La. Ann. 399 (1858); State v. Markham, 15 La. Ann.
498 (1860); State v. Courlas, 134 La. 364, 64 So. 141 (1913).
27. Ibid.
28. State v. King, 29 La. APnn. 704 (1877).
29. State ex rel. Teague v. Edwards, 107 La. 49, 31 So. 381 (1902).
80, Ibid.
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cases (within two years for lesser offenses), and it is expressly
stated that the district attorney is under a duty to nolle prosequi
the in ictment after the lapse of such time. If the district at-
torney fails or neglects to dismiss the prosecution, defendant is
given the right to apply to the judge by motion, and the judge is
empowered to enter the nolle prosequi on behalf of the state.
Article 9 sets forth the requirements and the procedure by which
the defendant may obtain a judicial nolle prosequi. Mere passage
of time will not, in and of itself, operate to annul the indict-
ment. It stands as a charge against the accused until it is form-
ally dismissed.8 1 By the express terms of Article 9, the burden
is on the defendant to prove the accrual of the prescription and
that he has complied with the requirements set forth therein.
In State v. Theard8 2 it was held that this class of prescrip-
tion was suspended when the defendant was adjudged insane
shortly after indictment and was, therefore, not amenable to
prosecution. It has also been held that the requirement of Article
9 that defendant obtain permission from the court before leaving
its jurisdiction refers to voluntary absence. Hence, when the de-
fendant was sent, in custody of the federal authorities, to a fed-
eral penitentiary outside this state, it was not necessary for him
to obtain permission from the court before leaving. His failure
to do so did not, therefore, suspend prescription while he was
absent.8 An analogy might possibly be drawn to the case where
a man under indictment is drafted into the armed forces.
Another question arising under this type of prescription is
whether it applies to all crimes, including those excepted from
the one year prescription of paragraph 1 in Article 8. The fore-
runner of this provision, Act 67 of 1926, specifically stated that
the prescription (under that act the periods were six and two
years, rather than three and two years) applied to indictments
of all offenses, "capital or otherwise." Article 8 is not worded so
strongly. The quaere then is whether the legislature, in temper-
ing the language of the statute, intended that the three year
prescriptive period should be subject to the exceptions which
limit the scope of the one year class, or whether an indictment
for murder8 ' will prescribe in three years if no action is taken
31. State v. Gunter, 188 La. 314, 177 So. 60 (1937).
32. 203 La. 1026, 14 So. (2d) 824 (1943).
33. State v. Shushan, 206 La. 415, 19 So.(2d) 185 (1944).
34. Or any of the other offenses excepted from the one year class of
prescription.
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thereon. The importance of this question lies in the substantial
advantages of having one's name freed from accusation" and in
the provision of Article 9 that any prosecution which is so pre-
scribed may be dismissed and may not thereafter be revived.
GORDON L. RICHEY
DEFAMATION-CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE IN LOUISIANA
It
The Louisiana law of defamation springs from Article 2315
of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides:
"Every act whatever of man which causes an injury to another,
shall oblige him by whose fault it happened to repair it...
Despite the obvious leeway which this article gives the court,
the Louisiana courts have developed a law of defamation closely
resembling that of common law jurisdictions.
In Louisiana, when the defendant has defamed the social,
business, or moral interests or character of another, he is liable
to the injured party without further proof of damage or bad faith.2
If, however, he can show that the occasion was one in which the
value to society that the communication be made was great
enough to justify the damage caused, the law allows a privilege
to the publisher, relieving him entirely from civil liability.
These privileges are of two types-absolute and conditional.
An absolute privilege exists in certain situations where the
public interest in unhampered freedom of speech is so strong
that the courts feel that no liability should be imposed under any
circumstances. This privilege is limited to judges, legislators,
and certain executives acting in their respective official capacities.
fn other situations the courts grant only limited protection to the
35. For one of these advantages, see State v. Gunter, 188 La. 314, 177 So.
60 (1937).
tThis is the first of two installments on this subject. Included are the
privileges to defame for self protection, for common interest, for the protec-
tion of a third party, and for the protection of the recipient. The privilege
of fair comment, the privilege to defame for the protection of the public,
together with the topic of abuse of the conditional privilege to defame will be
dealt with in the concluding installment of this comment which will be pub-
lished in the forthcoming issue of the Louisiana Law Review.
1. Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389 (1839); Sotorno v. Fourichon, 40 La. Ann.
423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Fellman v, Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895).
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